Biotechnology and the Future of Humanity by Cameron, Nigel M. de S.
Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) 
Volume 22 Issue 2 Article 7 
2006 
Biotechnology and the Future of Humanity 
Nigel M. de S. Cameron 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp 
Recommended Citation 
Nigel M. Cameron, Biotechnology and the Future of Humanity, 22 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 413 
(2006). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp/vol22/iss2/7 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) by an authorized editor of CUA 
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE OF
HUMANITY 
*
Nigel M de S. Cameron**
The more intense the controversy, the more important it is to penetrate
behind the putative issue of disagreement and explore the unspoken and
often unrecognized meta-questions at the root of the debate. That
commonplace could hardly be more apt than in the debates over embryonic
stem cell research and cloning that have convulsed both the United States
and Germany, and echoed around the globe. For behind the specifics of U.S.
debate over the funding of embryonic stem cell research, and more
fundamental German debate about whether the law should permit deleterious
research on human embryos at all, in response to both of which principled
compromise policy positions have been adopted, lies the fateful question of
the new powers we have taken to ourselves over ourselves, and whether the
exercise of these powers is or is not in our true interests as a human family.
Of course, to speak in that way is to beg many questions, most basically
the extent to which it may prove possible to set in place a discrimen that will
harvest the benefits of these technologies while shielding us from the threats
that they plainly pose to the integrity of humankind. But speak that way we
must, if we are to grasp the context in which the many particulars of this
debate should be framed. The greatest danger lies in our addressing them
merely seriatim, without a clear awareness of the relation of this or that part
to the whole. Because-as the course of the embryonic stem cell research
debate has revealed with some eloquence-public debates over science
policy tend to be dominated by scientists and the press, in its characteristic
combination of liberal political sympathy and the awe due from one elite for
another, handles challenges to mainstream scientific opinion as the
contemporary equivalent of lese-majeste.
Indeed, we should note the meretricious fashion in which the American
press has sought to frame this debate as simply a further round in the culture
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war over elective abortion-and thereby avoid the fundamental questions at
stake. It is true that the pro-life movement, after some initial misgivings, has
leant its political support to the campaign to stop human cloning. Indeed,
without their engagement there is little prospect here in the United States,
where 75% of the world's biotech research and development takes place, of
the political containment of biotechnology and the limitless ambitions of its
advocates. But the American press has willfully and consistently distorted
the nature of this debate, and that is nowhere more clear than in its refusal to
report on the global situation. The recent French and Canadian bans on
cloning for any purpose have remained unreported in major U.S. media,
since they shatter the paradigm that this is a "pro-life" issue. One web-based
journalist who did report the Canadian news told me that a week later she
wondered if she had misinterpreted the import of the law, since no one else
was writing about it. And in a recent debate on Beliefnet with Dartmouth
ethicist Ron Green, when I pressed the significance of the Canadian and
French laws, he maintained his position by arguing against all the evidence
that these cloning bans show the influence of "extreme pro-lifers" in France
and Canada. The fact that these jurisdictions permit elective abortion, and
that in Canada the pro-life movement actually opposed the legislation, did
not dislodge him from this idefixe. The American elite has used the pro-
life movement as a convenient means of disposing of ethical challenges to
these technologies. This does not augur well for the capacity of our
democracy to respond to the biopolicy agenda, and it suggests that nothing
may be as significant for the health of this debate as an understanding of the
German experience, in which the critique of biotechnology is deep-rooted
right across the political-cultural spectrum.
For the fundamental context of biotechnology lies in our understanding of
what it means to be human. At the fulcrum of every human culture lies a set
of assumptions about human nature-what it means to be a member of the
tribe. These assumptions are typically unstated. They are self-evident to
members of the group and therefore almost invisible in their common life.
What presents to us as a debate about the particulars of this or that
technology is in truth the question of the meaning of this technology in light
of our assumptions about the meaning of human nature. What seems to be
all about technology is in fact all about anthropology. And the
anthropological question is raised in two distinct ways.
On the one hand, we confront the question whether there is such a thing as
human nature, whether we accept its given-ness and while seeking to
cultivate its immense capacities-which is, of course, the story of
civilization, including not least its engagement in science, medicine and
technology-whether we maintain a determination to treat human nature on
its own terms. It is the saddest of ironies that at a time when what we might
term the enlightenment codification of human dignity has led to such
dramatic achievements in the realm of human rights, the dignity of women, a
recognition of the radical evil of racism, a new respect for the handicapped,
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and the growth of political freedoms around the globe, distorted notions of
the freedom of science and, increasingly, the freedom of markets should
threaten us with the reconstruction of human nature-not, as it were,
formally, in the manner in which human beings are treated, but materially, in
the manner in which they are constituted, by their own alleged freedom and
the freedom, it may be, of others.
Alongside the desirability of the reconstruction of human nature lies the
other side of the anthropological equation-the question of our confidence
in human beings to undertake such a task. It is interesting to note that, in
general, those most eager to be open to the remaking of human nature are
those with most confidence in the capacity of human beings to undertake it
with responsibility and skill. By contrast, those who value and seek to
safeguard its given-ness are most suspicious of the human capacity for both
technical and moral error.
The stakes could not be higher. It has been said that the cloning of Dolly
the sheep in 1996 bifurcates the history of the world. It announces to
humankind that we are in line to become not only the creators of our own
selves, but, in sad tandem, also its creatures, the products of our own
inventive selves, Homo sapiens in the hands of Homofaber.1 Thus do we
cross the Rubicon.
Cloning stands first in a succession of waves of technological
development that, one after another and in combinations we cannot predict,
are set to break upon the moral structures of our culture. It is intertwined
with the patenting of genetic material that has suddenly made this field
hugely attractive to investors and crippled the public good motivation of
researchers-and, indeed, the prospect of the patenting of engineered
embryos (a right which the biotechnology industry has recently trumpeted).
Back of it lies the prospect of"germline" gene interventions-modifications
of the germ cells that are inheritable by succeeding generations, as we
become able not just to pick but to "design" our babies and their progeny
forever. And, back of that, lie developments in cybernetics and
nanotechnology that take us beyond biology to its control and replication in
the manufacture of devices of intelligence and enhancement, and the
integration of the human and the mechanical, already the most exciting
research frontier of nanoscale research lies in the nano-bio interface of
medicine. While there are serious debates about whether artificial
intelligence will in fact be able to replicate and supersede the life of the
mind, there is no question that each of these waves of technological advance
and corporate opportunity will pose afresh the question at the heart of our
culture: what does it mean to be human, and what value do we place in the
given-ness of our human nature?
1. "Man the maker," a term used by anthropologists to focus on our capacity to use
tools to make things.
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In each case, of course, we are confronted with a cornucopia of
possibility-whether for healing or enhancement or, ultimately, control. We
may expect that the appeal will be intense, and the attraction of particular
applications marketed to us with full force. The policy parameters we agree
today will set the tone for all our tomorrows. And that, of course, is the
reason that some leaders of the bio-industrial complex are so deeply
committed to resisting policy development of any kind. Look at the manner
in which the global scientific community has decided to take it upon itself to
lobby the United Nations General Assembly. For them, this is round one of
struggle that may persist for a generation or more; and every succeeding
round will be easier for the side that wins at the outset.
Yet, we have now already begun to take that first decisive step across the
line that separates the beings we are from the things we make; thus Homo
faber prepares to turn his making on himself-and, in a single fateful act,
both elevate himself to the role of creator and degrade that same self to the
status of a manufacture, something "made by hand." Simultaneously, we
claim the role of God while in its exercise we are reduced to the dust of the
earth out of which we were made and to which we choose to return
ourselves. And, as we reflect on this act of usurpation, it is fascinating to
observe the terms in which even the advocates of these technologies are
forced back on the categories of "playing God"-and as in the title of Lee
Silver's manifesto for essentially unbridled biotech, Remaking Eden.2 Our
minds turn less to Frankenstein than to Faust. The ambiguity of the clonal
human as both Homo sapiens and the creature of Homo faber moves us
decisively toward what the post humanists call the "singularity"-that state
in which the distinction between what in Spielberg's movie Al 3 are termed
"mecha" and "orga"4 -human being and manufactured being-is over, and
a seamless dress weaves together our humankind and what we have made.
In summary, we should note here a threefold development. In Bioethics 1,
my term for the discussions of the past generation, the focus has been on
whether and when we should take life. Abortion and euthanasia form the
bookends of this debate, though it has many more subtle components, such
as definitions of brain death, transplant protocols, DNR orders, questions
about the so-called "persistent vegetative state," whether withdrawing food
and drink is permissible as the withdrawal of "treatment," and more besides.
The great questions of Bioethics I have focused on the taking of life. Its
disagreements and lack of resolution stem directly from the unresolved
questions of who is alive and who is human, and whether and when human
life may be deliberately taken.
2. LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN (Avon Books, Inc. 1997).
3. Artificial Intelligence: Al (Warner Brothers 2001).
4. These useful terms are from Spielberg's movie Artificial Intelligence: Al,
generally memorable only for its special effects.
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In Bioethics 2 we turn from the taking of life to the making of life,
decisions intended to enable us to design a child to order. That may be with
current technologies such as certain options made available by in vitro
fertilization-positively, the selection of desirable gametes; negatively, the
use of pre-implantation genetics diagnosis (PGD) to "weed out" the less
desirable embryos. But it will find its fulfillment in the far more
sophisticated options that will be enabled by the application of our growing
knowledge of human genetics to the design of human life.
In Bioethics 3,5 we move from taking life, through making life, to what I
have somewhat crudely termed the faking of life: the capacity of
developments in the fields of nanotechnology and cybernetics to manipulate,
enhance, and finally perhaps supplant biological human nature.
Let me make four substantive observations on the nature and course of
this great debate: on the abject failure of "bioethics;" the problematics of
Christian participation in public debate; the emergence of what could be a
whole new politics out of the biopolicy agenda; and, finally, the global
context.
I. THE FAILURE OF "BIOETHICS"
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that bioethics has failed abjectly as the
pretended arbiter of new biotechnologies in an uncertain culture that
nonetheless clings to its religious-moral identity and when confronted with
their fresh possibilities seeks arbitration. 6 While its practitioners may have
had many motives and concerns, the function of bioethics in the past thirty
years has been to commend new technologies to a suspicious public, and aid
their adoption. This has been accomplished by a mix of straightforward
advocacy, in which "bioethicists" are hired as consultants and
spokespersons, and much more subtle activities with more profound
consequences. The "ethics" in bioethics has been generally reduced to a
combination of hand-wringing, safety, and focus on due process questions
for individuals confronted with whatever the new technology may be.
The reductio ad absurdum of American bioethics is found in the National
Bioethics Advisory Commission's much-heralded report on cloning,
5. 1 gladly acknowledge the contribution of my friend and colleague Christopher
Hook, MD, who persuaded me that these developments qualified as a third division
within the bioethics agenda and proposed "Bioethics 3" to cover them. They share of
course the same goals as Bioethics 2. His essay in this book surveys these questions and
their implications. C. Christopher Hook, Cybernetics and Nanotechnology, in CUTTING-
EDGE BIOETHICS: A CHRISTIAN EXPLORATION OF TECHNOLOGIES AND TRENDS 52 (John F.
Kilner et al. eds., 2002).
6. This has been well argued, for example, in Tina Stevens' study Bioethics in
America.
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produced in 1997 in response to a presidential demand for a report within 90
days.7 While NBAC worked hard and took an unusual tack in spending
much of its time engaging with religious approaches to cloning (which, of
course, were conveniently to be found on both sides of the issue), its final
product, after the statutory hand-wringing, was a recommendation that there
be a brief moratorium on cloning for the purpose of making babies on safety
grounds, as good an example as we are likely to find of Horace's famous
saying about the mountains being in labor and bringing forth a ridiculous8
mouse.
By contrast, the successor President's Council on Bioethics has essentially
eschewed the "bioethics community" in favor of a reconstituted pre-
"bioethics" interdisciplinary discussion, and as a result its output, while less
monochrome than its detractors have suggested, has engaged the
fundamental question on human nature and biotechnology, especially in its
staff reports. Yet, there is something troubling about the phenomenon of
bioethics by expert committee, evident in many jurisdictions and also in the
UNESCO International Bioethics Committee process, as if bioethics were an
"expert" issue, like the law of the sea. It is on a par with summoning an
"expert" committee to decide whether to go to war. Granted, that decision
should not be for the generals. But should it be for whatever gathering of
academics and policy wonks a government might appoint to make such
choices? Rather, we need to bring the biopolicy agenda to center-stage in the
political process and acknowledge that-as one early bioethics writer put
it-bioethics is "everybody's ethics."
II. THE PROBLEMATIC OF A CHRISTIAN VOICE IN PUBLIC BIOETHICS
As western culture moves ever deeper into the period characterized a
generation ago by historian Christopher Dawson as "secularized
Christendom," the emerging inter-disciplinary field that since its naming in
1970 has gone by the name "bioethics" can be understood only as a
microcosm of the whole. The effacing of religious discourse from the public
square, especially in the United States, has raised profound difficulties for
the development of a bioethics rooted in the Christian vision of human
nature. The contrast with Europe is of course striking, in that while there are
far lower levels of religious participation in all the major European
countries, there remains in most of them a higher level of tolerance for
religious voices in the public square. If religion is removed from the
7. National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Cloning Human Beings Report and
Recommendations of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (1997), available at
http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrcbl/nbac/pubs/cloning i /cloning.pdf.
8. Horace, De Arte Poetica line 139.
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metaphor of public affairs, it is only in translation that the Christian
worldview retains any opportunity to shape the public institutions of the
culture. The predicament of Christianity in bioethics lies precisely here.
The vision of human beings defined by their creation in the image of God
sets the Christian agenda, to be addressed within public and professional
contexts in translation. Yet, the exercise of translation has itself led to the
"marginalization" of religion. As the ebb-tide of the sea of faith runs fast, it
has become standard practice to translate Christian moral argument into
secular language for public purposes. As a communication strategy in a
changing culture, this would be estimable were it to succeed. But it has
failed. The power of the secular conversation has to a striking extent shaped
the thinking of religious participants and led many of them, as it were, to go
native. The Christian voice has been entirely marginalized in the mainstream
of bioethics, and partly as a consequence outside the issue of abortion, there
is a general dearth of interest in the biopolicy agenda within the various
conservative Christian communities. Just as there is no major critique of the
secular assumptions and utilitarian method of the bioethics mainstream, our
Christian institutions-Catholic and evangelical-have failed to develop an
alternative institutional bioethics community that can speak into the public
square.
Indeed, it has been left to Leon Kass, longtime critic of potential abuses of
genetic technology and now chairman of the President's Council on
Bioethics, to emerge as the leading voice in articulating such concerns.
Noting that advances in genetics "cannot be treated in isolation" but must be
correlated with "other advances in reproductive and developmental biology,
in neurobiology, and in the genetics of behavior-indeed, with all the
techniques now and soon to be marshaled to intervene ever more directly
and precisely into the bodies and minds of human beings." 9 While scientists
like to portray such questioning as arising from "scientific ignorance or else
to outmoded moral and religious notions," a theme that has been
depressingly dominant in the course of the controversies we have outlined,
Kass goes to the heart of the question. The very success of our technology
has given fresh impetus to a materialistic reduction of human nature which
goes far beyond the rejection of this or that religious conviction or moral
boundary. "Hence our peculiar moral crisis: we adhere more and more to a
view of human life that gives us enormous power and that, at the same time,
denies every possibility of nonarbitrary standards for guiding the use of this
power." In consequence, "we are doomed to become its creatures if not its
slaves."'
'
9. Leon R. Kass, The Moral Meaning of Genetic Technology, COMMENTARY, Sept.
1999, at 34, 35.
10. Id. at 38.
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Kass here alludes to the famous essay of C. S. Lewis, which he has earlier
quoted. In "The Abolition of Man, ' 1 an occasional piece first published as
far back as 1943, Lewis - English literary scholar, novelist, and lay
theologian-addresses from afar the coming challenges of human genetics.
Lewis' essay opens with a potent quotation from the English Puritan John
Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress: "It came burning hot into my mind, whatever
he said and however he flattered, when he got me home to his house, he
would sell me for a slave."' 12 That, in embryo, is Lewis' percipient response
to the prospect of the genetic revolution and what lies beyond.
His argument opens with a consideration of the fact that all technology,
which is said to extend the power of the human race, is in fact a means of
extending the power of "some men over other men." He instances the radio
and the airplane as typical products of technology which like all other
consumer items can be bought by some, not afforded by others, and could be
withheld by some from others who have the resources to buy. Writing after
four years of total war in Europe, Lewis is peculiarly aware of the capacities
of these technologies to be used to subject some to the power of others,
whether in dropping bombs or broadcasting propaganda. But his third
example, the bridge to the potentials of biotechnology, lies in contraception.
Here some special features attach to the more general problems of use and
abuse, since "there is a paradoxical, negative sense in which all possible
future generations are the patients or subjects of a power wielded by those
already alive." This is true at two levels. "By contraception simply, they are
denied existence; by contraception used as a means of selective breeding,
they are, without their concurring voice, made to be what one generation, for
its own reasons, may choose to prefer., 1 3 In light of the pervasive influence
of eugenic thinking and practice, in the United States and the United
Kingdom as well as Germany, in which enforced sterilization was widely
employed for selective breeding purposes, Lewis is building his argument on
the technology of the early 20th century even as he anticipates that of the
21 st. As a result, he continues, "From this point of view, what we call Man's
power over Nature turns out to be a power exercised by some men over
other men with Nature as its instrument."' 14 He hastens to add that while it
can be easily said that "men have hitherto used badly, and against their
fellows, the powers that science has given them," that is not his point. He is
11. C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man, in ON MORAL MEDICINE: THEOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 270 (Stephen E. Lammers & Allen Verhey eds., 2d ed.
1998). The Abolition of Man was first published in 1943 as part of collection of three
essays, under the same overall title, directed specifically at the improvement of teaching
in English high schools.
12. JOHN BUNYAN, THE PILGRIM'S PROGRESS 88 (Oxford Univ. Press 1932) (1678).
13. Lewis, supra note I I at 270.
14. Id.
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not addressing "particular corruptions and abuses which an increase of moral
virtue would cure," but rather "what the thing called 'Man's power over
Nature' must always and essentially be."'15 For "all long-term exercises of
power, especially in breeding, must mean the power of earlier generations
over later ones."
' 6
What Lewis is here drawing attention to is, at it were, the genetic
equivalent of what in another field is termed inter-generational economics.
In the nature of the case, the genetic accounting is of a yet higher level of
significance than economic relationships run through time, although the
principle is the same: the impact of one generation's decisions on subsequent
generations. So Lewis states:
We must picture the race extended through time from the date of
its emergence to that of its extinction. Each generation exercises
power over its successors: and each, in so far as it modifies the
environment bequeathed to it and rebels against tradition, resists
and limits the power of its predecessors. There can be no increase
in power on Man's side. Each new power won by man is a power
over man as well. Each advance leaves him weaker as well as
stronger. In every victory, besides the general who triumphs, he is
a prisoner who follows the triumphal car.... Human nature will be
the last part of Nature to surrender to Man. The battle will then be
won. We shall have 'taken the thread of life out of the hand of
Clotho' and be henceforth free to make our species whatever we
wish it to be. The battle will indeed be won. But who, precisely,
will have won it?
17
Because "the power of Man to make himself what he pleases means, as
we have seen, the power of some men to make other men what they please....
Man's final conquest has proved to be the abolition of Man."' 18 While much
of Lewis' analysis is directed at the possibility of germline (inheritable)
genetic interventions, his twofold thesis is of wider application: first, he sets
out the fundamental problematic of biotechnology and its affiliates as a vast
challenge that must be addressed; and, second, he frames its significance
precisely in the context of anthropology. While his argument uses public
language, his starting-point is the Christian understanding of what it means
to be human, an understanding built deep into the western cultural tradition.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at271.
18. Id. at 271-72.
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Ill. THE NEW BIOPOLITICS
In his famous jeremiad, "Why the Future Doesn't Need Us,"' 9 Bill Joy,
one of the technology geniuses of his generation who co-founded of Sun
Microsystems, claims that genetics, robotics, and nanotechnology are the
three great threats to the human race in the 21st century. Through some
mixture of accident and intent they are likely to destroy the human species,
or supplant it, through some biological or mechanical meltdown or through
the triumph of machine intelligence. One does not need to buy the whole
thesis to acclaim his comprehensive framing of the issues.
As the cloning debate has already shown, the questions raised by
biotechnology are not the same kind of issues as have traditionally divided
our politics. The very fact that opposition to cloning has come from both
sides of the pro-life and pro-choice divide illustrates this forcefully.
"Conservatives" and "progressives" share a respect for human nature and a
distrust of manipulative interventions that will enable certain men and
women to re-shape others. This pits political progressives against the
mainstream "liberals" they thought were their friends-and thereby,
ironically, to let big biotech business do what it chooses. And on the
conservative side, it pits those who treasure the dignity of life against both
libertarians and others who tend uncritically to favor corporate interests.
While the making of common cause on the bio-agenda on the part of those
divided by abortion and broader political-cultural interests is more dramatic
here in the U.S. than in Germany, the need to move from ad hoc
collaboration to the development of common ideas and a systematic agenda
for common action is reflected in both nations. Here in the U.S., halfa dozen
issues have been identified as areas for close co-operation: cloning, germline
interventions, genetic discrimination, gene patent reform, reproductive
technology regulation, and nanotechnology/cybernetics with their capacity
for human enhancement.
It is hard to predict how this newfound alliance between those divided by
their general political philosophy, and their view on issues like abortion, will
develop. What is clear is that questions of biopolicy do not fit neatly into our
traditional politics, and they therefore present us with special political
challenge. This combination of pro-life and pro-choice forces could prove a
novel and potent political force as the issues of biopolicy rise steadily up the
policy agenda. If it is truly the case that they represent the major questions of
domestic policy to be confronted in the 21st century, their final impact on
our politics is hard to estimate.
19. Bill Joy, Why the Future Doesn't Need Us, WIRED, Apr. 2000, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.04/joy.html.
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IV. THE GLOBAL CONTEXT
As we meet this week two crucial sets of conversations are in process that
could have profound effects on the future of biopolicy around the globe, and
therefore of the human race. In Paris, the UNESCO International Bioethics
Committee is working to complete its "universal instrument on bioethics" in
time for approval at the UNESCO general conference in the fall of 2005.
This has been in process for more than a decade and operates at several
removes from political accountability and public awareness. In parallel, the
U.N. General Assembly, through its Sixth Committee (the legal committee)
has been addressing what was originally a German-French proposal for a
global convention to prohibit "reproductive" cloning. Since this would
implicitly permit the mass cloning of human embryos for research purposes,
and at the same time through the perfecting of cloning technology and the
availability of large numbers of embryos enhance the chances of the birth of
clonal babies, many nations have gathered in opposition to such an
approach. Under domestic pressure, the German government has withdrawn
from active advocacy of its original proposal, although it cast a crucial vote
in 2003 for a procedural delay. Belgium has taken over leadership of the
position, with around 20 nations co-sponsoring versus nearly 60 co-
sponsoring a Costa Rican resolution that would seek to ban all human
cloning for whatever purpose.
There is little doubt that the two most potent forces in the world that seek
the containment of biotechnology lie in Germany and the United States.
Specifically, they lie in the German conscience, with its sophisticated and
multi-party commonalities in the area of biopolicy; and, in the U.S., in the
potent influence of the churches, evangelical and Catholic, focused chiefly
in the pro-life agenda and yet broadening into a wider recognition of the
final significance of biotechnology for human nature. However, events are
played out at UNESCO and the UNGA, there lie within the communities of
conscience in our two nations the power to shape global biopolicy. Since the
alternative is the essentially unregulated development of whatever
technology the market will bear-each stage of which would of course be
scrutinized, and the finally approved, by the bioethics community-the need
is urgent for persons of conscience to develop a common discrimen as the
basis for global biopolicy. We must head off a new eugenics, embrace
prohibitions on the commodification of the human body and germline
interventions as well as all notions of enhancement by whatever means (bio,
nano, cybernetics); and thereby encourage the genuinely therapeutic
application of these technologies. If such a lead does not come from
Germany and the United States, it is hard to imagine an alternative.
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